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NO SUCCESS IN SECESSION:  135 YEARS AGO THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA EXPERIENCED CIVIL WAR, NOW CANADA 
GRAPPLES WITH THE POSSIBLE SECESSION OF QUEBEC 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From 1861 through 1865, the northern and southern states of the newly 
formed United States were engaged in a Civil War.1  The victory of the 
northern states denied the Southern Confederacy the opportunity to secede 
from the Union.  The American Civil War was a victory for the supremacy of 
the Constitution and nationalism.2  The next 135 years witnessed the United 
States defining its place as the most influential global nation.3  Secession by 
the Southern Confederacy would have resulted in a different United States than 
we know today.4 
Now the northern boundary of the United States is confronted by a 
possible secession.  The predominately French speaking people of Quebec 
want to secede from Canada and form an independent state in the international 
community.5  Cultural and linguistic differences divide the province of Quebec 
from the rest of English speaking Canada.6  The basic differences between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada extend to include trivial matters such as traffic 
regulations and electricity consumption.7  All of these differences deepen the 
Quebeckers’ perception that Quebec has a unique and distinct French culture.8  
The Separatist political party of Quebec, the Patri Quebecosis (PQ), believes 
that the interests of French Canadians are being ignored by the national 
 
 1. Timeline of the Civil War (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.civilwar.com/timebot. 
htm>. 
 2. ROGER GIBBINS, REGIONALISM: TERRITORIAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 13 (1982). 
 3. See generally GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 170. 
 4. Gita Pullapilly, Indiana’s Contribution to the Civil War Detailed in Roundtable 
Discussion, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Aug. 3, 1998, at H4. 
 5. See generally Anthony DePalma, Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its 
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A3. 
 6. Anthony DePalma, Quebeckers Revel in Differences, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 29, 
1998, at A34. 
 7. Id.  “Quebec is the only province in Canada that does not allow drivers to make a right 
turn at a red light.”  This is for safety reasons.  As for electricity consumption, people in Quebec 
use more electric heat than any other province in Canada.  Id. 
 8. Id. 
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government.9  The Separatists in power promote secession as the only way for 
the French Canadians to survive and flourish.10  However, on August 20, 1998, 
the Supreme Court of Canada decided that Quebec could not unilaterally 
secede from Canada.11 
The Supreme Court relied in part on international law to make its 
decision.12  In areas of the world with oppression and fundamental violations 
of human rights, “secession is associated with freedom, democracy, and the 
aspirations of a better life with political freedom.”13  International law 
recognizes secession as a last resort for “peoples” in extremely dire 
situations.14  “Peoples” refers to a group of people, sharing a distinct language 
and culture, who are not free to participate in the national government’s 
economic, social, and political endeavors.15  In this context, Quebec does not 
have such a claim. 
If Quebec successfully seceded from Canada, it would amount to a failed 
experiment in tolerance and diversity.  In a recent report, UNESCO World 
Commission on Culture and Development recognized Canada as a world 
leader in the area of multiculturalism.16  Secession would send the message 
that diversity within a nation cannot work anywhere if it cannot work in a 
place like Canada.17 
The American Civil War was a victory for nationalism and future success.  
Past generations of Americans fought the Civil War to prove that the South had 
no right to end the Union based on territorial differences.18  Canada is now at a 
crucial stage in its nation’s history, in the ultimate fight for a national identity 
 
 9. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 382-91 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text. 
 13. Thomas H. Naylor, Latvia Did It; Scotland’s Doing It; Why Not Vermont?, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 20, 1998, at A9. 
 14. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 280-89 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Facts on Canada, Multiculturalism (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://canada.cio-
bic.gc.ca/facts/multi-e.html>.  In 1988, the Canadian government passed the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act.  The policy behind this Act “affirms that Canada recognizes and values its 
rich ethnic and racial diversity.  The Canadian Multiculturalism Act gives specific direction to the 
federal government to work toward achieving equality in the economic, social, cultural and 
political life of the country.  Through its multiculturalism policy, the government wants to help 
build a more inclusive society based on respect, equality and full participation of all citizens, 
regardless of race, ethnic origin, language, or religion.”  Id.  See CIA-The World Fact Book, 
Appendix A: Abbreviations (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook 
/appa.html>.  UNESCO is the abbreviation for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization.  Id. 
 17. See infra notes 235-36, 261-62 and accompanying text. 
 18. Quebec Can’t Just Quit, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 22, 1998, at O14. 
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for its future generations.19  On an international scale, secession is a last resort 
for people in oppressive and politically discriminatory situations and the 
people in Quebec are not in such a situation.20  However, the people of Canada 
must form a national identity, one that celebrates the cultural distinctiveness of 
both the English and French in the nation of Canada.  This is a lesson that was 
learned over the past 135 years from the United States’ defeat of a secessionist 
movement and formation of a national identity.21 
This Comment provides an explanation and evaluation of the legality of 
the secession of Quebec from Canada under domestic and international law.22  
The reality of the consequences of secession for Quebec and the rest of the 
world is also examined.23  The possibility of secession has aroused the 
concerns of the international community as the fragmentation of states disrupts 
the present world order of peace, security, and stability.24  All of this is 
examined against the background of the United States’ experience with the 
American Civil War.25  Part II of this Comment first analyzes the history of 
both the United States and Canada to find in its constitutional development the 
roots planted for secession.26  Part II then compares the idea of how the Civil 
War, a defeat of secession, was a victory for a nationalistic America, with 
Canada’s territorial conflicts, especially in Quebec, which have proven to be a 
barrier to a sense of nationalism.27 
Part III of this Comment begins with the decision of the legality of 
secession of Quebec in Canada’s Supreme Court.28  It analyzes the underlying 
meaning of the Court’s decision to Canada and its impact on the international 
community.29  Part IV expands on the concept of secession in an international 
law context.  Part IV also addresses the balance between the territorial integrity 
of sovereign states, like Canada, and the right of self-determination of 
“peoples” as applied to the people of Quebec.30  Part V evaluates the two 
alternatives for Quebec: the consequences of Quebec’s decision if it secedes 
from the rest of Canada for Quebec, and the consequence if Quebec remains a 
 
 19. See generally id. 
 20. See infra notes 267-69, 294-99 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra 83-86 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 59-86 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text; see also DePalma, supra note 5, at A3.  
“This is believed the first time a democratic country has ever tested in advance the legal terms of 
its own dissolution.”  Id. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
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part of Canada.31  The Comment concludes that secession is not in the best 
interest of Quebec or Canada as a whole.32 
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
When looking at the issue of secession, it is imperative to begin by 
examining the historical background of the seceding state.33  A state’s history 
often explains its character with respect to the culture, politics, and economic 
realities of the present day.34  A recurring problem throughout history has been 
the effect of such different attitudes and backgrounds on the unity of states.35 
More than a hundred years ago, the United States dealt with the problem of 
how to unify the individual states.36  It would eventually take a civil war to 
suppress the separatist movement in the southern states in favor of a union.37  
Now Canada and Quebec grapple with similar issues of national identity.  The 
recent movement toward Quebec’s secession is a defining time in the future of 
Canada as a nation. 
A. America’s History of Secession 
1. Formation of the United States Constitution 
The United States Articles of Confederation in 1781 formed a loose 
association of sovereign states.38  The agreement formed a compact among 
states, which voluntarily observed national law.39  However, the main 
weakness of the Articles of Confederation was that it vested the states with the 
majority of the power instead of the national government.40  For example, the 
federal government lacked the ability to unify policies and laws among the 
states to create a strong union.41  Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
federal government did not have the power to tax in order to raise revenue; as a 
result of lacking monetary support, the Union could not survive.42 
 
 31. See infra Part V. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally infra Part II. 
 34. See infra notes 38-86 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background of 
the United States); see infra notes 87-121 and accompanying text (discussing the historical 
background of Canada). 
 35. See infra notes 38-86. 
 36. See generally GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 12-13, 170-71. 
 37. See generally id. at 170. 
 38. Id. at 8. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 9. 
 41. See generally id. at 9-10.  See also LEONARD W. LEVY, ESSAYS ON MAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION xii-xiii (1969) (discussing the new powers of the central government and the 
inadequacy of the Articles of the Confederation). 
 42. See generally LEVY, supra note 41, at xii. 
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In 1787, recognizing the flaws of the Articles of Confederation, state 
government delegates gathered in Philadelphia with the goal of improving 
American nationalism.43  Under the guidance of James Madison, the new 
Constitution was drafted to enable the national government to administer laws 
directly on individual citizens rather than through state governments.44  
However, at the convention, two conflicting philosophies emerged.45  One 
view demanded a centralized government with a “close union and a common 
national citizenship,” while the other view required a decentralized and loose 
association of autonomous states.46  The goal of the convention was to balance 
these two philosophies.47  The compromise was federalism, in which a union 
of states was under the control of a central government.48  Each state would 
have elected representatives in the federal government.49 
a. Doctrine of States’ Rights 
“The evolution of American federalism can be traced through the doctrine 
of states’ rights.”50  The doctrine of states’ rights encompassed the ideology 
that the Union was a formation of sovereign states, which retained autonomy 
over their internal affairs.51  In July of 1831, John Calhoun, who became the 
most famous spokesman of states’ rights, stated his view that “the Constitution 
was a compact made by the states in a sovereign capacity rather than people in 
a national capacity.”52  This philosophy stemmed from a fear of an over 
intrusive government and political centralization.53  However, the new 
Constitution addressed this fear by directing the federal government’s powers 
at the people instead of at the states.54  In the United States’ Constitution, 
powers not delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states are 
 
 43. See GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 9. 
 44. Id.  LEVY, supra note 41, at xiii (1969).  The Articles of Confederation failed because 
they only required voluntary observance of federal law by all states.  Something that could not be 
hoped for with state governments already set up.  Id. at xii-xiii. 
 45. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 9. 
 46. DAVID G. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (1965). 
 47. Id. at 35.  See also GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 9.  This disagreement foreshadowed the 
battle that lay ahead for the Union.  Id. 
 48. See generally GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 9. 
 49. Id. Although states were given representative power, the Constitution made the state 
governments “subordinate” to the national government (quoting. WILLIAM H RIKER, 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 492, 493 (1965) “[T]he federalism of 1787 achieved a 
converse effect, however, for it subordinated the member governments and created a nation.  
Thus, state governments could not override national decisions.  The federal government had a 
binding effect on all states, thus a nation was created).  Id. 
 50. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 20. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 9. 
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reserved for the states.55  The separation of powers between the national 
government and individual states limited the centralized government and 
protected freedom.56  As organized, the central government would not be big 
enough to usurp states’ power and consume individual freedoms.57  Thus, the 
principle of federalism allowed a means by which state governments were 
preserved, and it allowed a system in which state interests could be represented 
in a national government with power over the people comprising the Union. 58 
B. The North and the South: Diverging Interests 
As federalism evolved during the 1800s, the central government in 
Washington D.C. was not as influential throughout the Union as was hoped.59  
Acceptance of the Constitution faced resistance from state governments, which 
had pre-dated the national government.60  These states, prior to the Union, had 
“built up solid self-interests and loyalties.”61  Thus, United States’ citizens did 
not favor a centralized government in Washington.62  Prior to the 1860s two 
very different societies in the North and South emerged.63 
In the South, this philosophy of states’ rights took a strong hold.64  While 
the northern states developed as the industrial centers of the Union, the 
southern states held on to their plantations and slavery.65  Emancipation of 
slaves in northern states gradually gained popularity as people in the North 
began to recognize “all men as free and equal” while slavery continued to be 
an integral part of the economic life of the South.66  In 1858, Abraham Lincoln, 
as a candidate for the Republican Party for the United States Senate, made a 
speech in which he declared “a house divided against itself cannot stand.  I 
believe this Government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free.  I 
do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but 
 
 55. Gibbins, supra note 2, at 10.  Under the Tenth Amendment, “the powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the states, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively or to the people.”  Id. 
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See generally SMITH, supra note 46, at 53.  See also GIBBINS, supra note 2, 9-11. 
 59. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 12. 
 60. Id. at 29. 
 61. Id. 
 62. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 12. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 13. 
 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. See generally Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States 1989, Abraham 
Lincoln First Inaugural Address Monday March 4, 1861 (visited Oct. 16, 1999) 
<http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html>; Early Antislavery, Aboard the Underground 
Railroad (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/underground/antislav.htm> 
(discussing how the Northern states as “free regions” attracted many slaves from the South). 
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I do expect it will cease to be divided.”67  Lincoln’s election as President in 
1860 of the United States was the final straw for Southern states, who sensed 
that with Lincoln as President, the federal government would take away their 
right to own slaves as property.68  The foreshadowing at the Convention of two 
diverging philosophies had come full circle in the Civil War.  The secession of 
the Southern states followed, creating the Confederate States of America.69  In 
1861, thirteen states from the South gave Ordinances of Secession, which were 
actual declarations of causes in which each state disclosed its reason for 
wanting to sever from the Federal Union.70 
As the common thread of these ordinances, each charged the federal 
government with “dangerous infractions of the Constitution.”71  Seceding 
states felt the fear of a large controlling federal government in Washington 
D.C. infringing on the individual state’s common peace and security.72  
Northern states’ interests were represented, while the belief in the southern 
states was that their interests were being ignored.73  Southerners perceived the 
North destroying the guarantees of the Constitution, in respect to property 
rights.74  For example, citizens of the northern states confiscated southerners’ 
property by freeing their slaves.75  The soon to be confederacy felt that by 
allowing violations of such rights, the federal government had failed to 
 
 67. Speeches by Abraham Lincoln, House Divided Speech (visited Oct. 16, 1999) 
<http://www.netins.net/showcase/creative/lincoln/speeches/house.htm>.  This is an excerpt from 
Lincoln’s “House Divided Speech,” given on June 16, 1858 in Springfield, Illinois before the 
Republican delegates.  Later that day, the Republicans chose him as their candidate for U.S. 
Senate.  Id. 
 68. See WILLIAM ANDERSON, THE NATION AND STATES, RIVALS OR PARTNERS?  97 (1955); 
see also The U.S. Civil War Center, La. St. U., Ordinances of Secession (visited Sept. 9, 1998) 
<http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/> (discussing the Alabama Ordinance of Secession). 
 69. Id.  The Ordinances of Secession were the actual legal language by which the seceded 
states severed with the federal union.  The Declaration of Causes was where each state gave their 
reason for secession. 
 70. Id.  The thirteen seceding states were as follows: South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Missouri, 
and Kentucky. Id. 
 71. Id.  The language quoted in the accompanying text is from Alabama’s Ordinance.  The 
language of all the ordinances shared the sentiment of the national governments usurping the 
power reserved to the states as the cause of secession.  Id. 
 72. Id.  See also GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
 73. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 10. 
 74. ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 97.  See also Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation 
Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862), reprinted in Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation 
(1863) (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usaP/all6/writings/emancip.htm>. This 
proclamation provided for the freedom of the slaves.  This angered the Southern States, as they 
were the slave owners.  Slaves were held as their property.  Id. 
 75. ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 97.  See also Ordinances of Secession, supra note 68. This 
is inferred from the language in the Texas Ordinance. 
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accomplish the purposes of the compact of the Union between the states.76  
The federal government was seen as “a weapon with which to strike down the 
interests and property of the people” of the southern slave holding states.77  
Southerners believed that the federal government had usurped the power of the 
states, and as a result, interfered with the rights and liberties of these states.78  
In contrast, Northerners viewed the United States as a compact among people, 
where the people had delegated a portion of their sovereignty to the state 
government and a portion to the national government.79 
The young Union was suffering an identity problem and its only outlet to 
resolve these tensions was civil war.80  The South, fighting for states’ rights, 
had to defeat the North in a military battle in order to dissolve the Union.81  
Lincoln was willing to fight to save the Union and establish national 
supremacy.82 
The Civil War established the supremacy of the national government’s 
dominance over states as sovereign units.  The sacrifice of 700,000 lives 
evidenced that states were not sovereign entities in a loose alliance, but part of 
a single nation.83  Thus, the evolution of federalism in America can be seen as 
the erosion of states’ rights.84  The outcome of the Civil War legitimized the 
view that the Constitution comes from the sovereign people, not the states.85  
This philosophy is expressed in the preamble of the Constitution, namely “We 
the people of the United States,” has become the supreme and nationalizing 
force in the American identity.86 
C. Canada’s History of Secession 
1. Discovery of Quebec 
In 1608, the French geographer and explorer Samuel de Champlain 
traveled the St. Lawrence River and founded Quebec City, in an area that 
 
 76. Id.  This is inferred from the language of the Texas Ordinance. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Ordinances of Secession, supra note 68.  The Kentucky ordinance addressed how the 
states were given residual powers in the Constitution and the federal government was usurping 
these powers.  Id. 
 79. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 79.  See also GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 8-9, 
21. 
 80. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
 81. Quebec Can’t Just Quit, supra note 18, at O14. 
 82. Id. 
 83. GARTH STEVENSON, UNFULFILLED UNION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL 
UNITY 20 (1982). 
 84. Id. 
 85. ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 85. 
 86. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
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would be known as New France.87  The purpose of settlement was to reap the 
benefits of the fur trade for France.88  Quebec had become France’s first 
permanent Canadian colony in the “New World.”89  Champlain had taken 
French colonists to settle there.90  However, the French were not alone in their 
discovery of Canada.  In the early 1500s, the English claimed right of 
discovery to Newfoundland, on the eastern coast of North America, and 
neighboring regions.91  The English were after the riches of the fur trade as 
well.92  The English, who dominated the Hudson Bay area, were threatened by 
the expansion of the French settlement.93 
The English and French rivalry eventually erupted in war, with the fall of 
Quebec City to British forces in 1759.94  New France became a British colony 
after the “conquest.”95  However, the British now faced an immediate problem 
because the area that it had captured was the home to more than 60,000 new 
French speaking subjects.96  To rectify this situation, the English Parliament 
passed by Royal Proclamation, the Quebec Act of 1774, which recognized 
French civil law, guaranteed religious freedom, and authorized the use of 
French language, as well as increasing the size of Quebec.97  As English 
Loyalists settled into the western area of Quebec, they wanted British civil law 
and the English language not French civil law or use of the French language.98  
 
 87. See generally C.E. HEINDENREICH, EXPLORATION AND MAPPING OF SAMUEL DE 
CHAMPLAIN 1603-1630 1-4 (1976).  See also Canada, The Founding of New France (visited Feb. 
12, 2000) <http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>.  Champlain administered 
the affairs of Quebec, France’s first permanent Canadian colony, Acadia.  Id. 
 88. See Canada, The Founding of New France, supra note 87.  The new methods of 
processing fur in Europe provided the “encouragement” to continue the fur trade in Canada.  Id. 
 89. See id. supra note 87.  See generally Canada, Discovery of Canada (visited Feb. 12, 
2000) <http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>. 
 90. Canada, The Founding of New France, supra note 87. 
 91. Canada, Rediscovery and Exploration (visited Feb. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>.  The English voyages were called the 
Cabot voyages, which were intended to find a new trade route to the Orient for King Henry VII of 
England. 
 92. Canada, French and English Rivalry (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.optonline. 
com/ comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-1842), 
Conquest and a Fledgling Regime (visited Feb.8, 2000) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/lowercan/elowrcan.htm> [hereinafter Towards Confederation, Conquest].  See also 
Canada, The Final Struggle for the Continent  (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.optonline. 
com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>. 
 95. See Towards Confederation, Conquest, supra note 94. 
 96. Canada, Early British Rule (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.optonline. 
com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>. 
 97. See Towards Confederation, Conquest, supra note 94. 
 98. See Canada, The United Empire Loyalists (visited Feb. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>.  Following the American Revolution, 
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Thus, the Quebec Act became difficult to enforce among the influx of English 
settlers.99  Therefore, to satisfy English interests, the Constitutional Act of 
1791 divided this Canadian territory into two parts: a mostly English-speaking 
Upper Canada, Ontario, and a mostly French-speaking Lower Canada, today 
known as Quebec.100  After rebellious acts in both regions against the English 
Army in 1837, Great Britain reunited Upper and Lower Canada into one 
province by the Union Act in 1840.101  The purpose of the Union Act was to 
assimilate the two Canadian colonies under British rule.102  Furthermore, the 
Union Act mandated English as the only official language in the newly united 
Canada.103  The Union Act favored British colonization, and “French 
Canadians began their existence as a minority.”104  Thus, they would remain 
united until 1867, when they would once again be divided into separate 
provinces: Quebec and Ontario.105 
 
thousands of British loyalists left the United States and immigrated into the lands above the St. 
Lawrence River and north of Lake Ontario.  They were known as the United Empire Loyalists.  
Their immigration into Canada was the “first major wave of English-speaking settlers since the 
days of New France.”  Id.  See also Towards Confederation,Conquest, supra note 94. 
 99. See Towards Confederation, Conquest, supra note 94. 
 100. See National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-1842), 
The Constitutional Act of 1791 (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/lowercan/elowrcan.htm>.  At this time, population in Lower Canada was 160,000 
of which 20,000 were English.  Id. 
 101. See Towards Confederation, Towards Confideration: Lower Canada (1791-1842), A 
History of Lower Canada (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/lowercan/elowrcan.htm>.  However, Upper Canada and Lower Canada conflicted 
with each other.  There was debate over the amount of subsidies and custom duties allocated to 
each colony.  Lower Canada looked to Great Britain for help in these situations.  However, Great 
Britain provided no assistance.  Thus, each colony felt deprived, fueling ethnic tensions.  Radicals 
began to attack the English Army stationed in Lower Canada.  Uprisings also took place in Upper 
Canada.  See also National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-
1842), A History of Lower Canada, The Durham Report (1839) (visited Feb. 8, 2000) 
<http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/confed/lowercan/elowrcan.htm>.  “To put Canadians in a state of 
political subordination, London introduced the Union Act in 1840.”  Id. 
 102. See National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-1842), 
A History of Lower Canada, The Union Act 1840 (visited 2/8/00) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/lowercan/elowrcan.htm>.  The names West Canada and East Canada replaced the 
names Upper and Lower Canada, respectively.  Id. 
 103. See also National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-
1842), A History of Lower Canada, The Durham Report (1839), supra note 101. 
 104. National Library of Canada, Towards Confederation: Lower Canada (1791-1842), A 
History of Lower Canada, The Union Act 1840, supra note 102. 
 105. See infra note 106; see also Canada, The Confederation Idea, (visited Feb. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>.  Under the Union Act, it was difficult 
for east and west Canada, with two conflicting agendas, to share political representation in 
Parliament.  Thus, no government was able to gain a majority in Parliament.  National Library of 
Canada, The Path to Confederation (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/path.html>.  At this same time, the Maritime Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova 
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2. Constitutional Formation 
Canada as a new federal state came into existence in 1867 with the passage 
of the British North America Act (BNA Act).106  A constitutional arrangement 
was needed to protect the interests of the French Canadians, who had formed 
Canada East, from the English majority, while at the same time uniting the 
French and English cultures under a new Canadian nation.107  To achieve this 
goal, a model of American federalism was used.108 
In witnessing the Civil War in the United States over states’ rights, 
Canadians observed a near dissolution of the United States.109  The onset of the 
Civil War demonstrated how American states were given too many residual 
powers in the Constitution.110  The Canadian framers believed that the flaws of 
the American system could be corrected by strengthening the Canadian 
national government.111  However, Canada, unlike the United States, did not 
have state governments that predated the national form of government.112  
Quebec and Ontario were already a single political unit as a result of the Union 
Act in 1840.113  Thus, the philosophy of states before the central government, 
 
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island were considering a union of these provinces.  In June of 1864, 
East and West Canada met with the Maritime Provinces in Quebec to discuss a proposed union of 
British North American colonies.  From October 10-27, 1864, the province of Canada met with 
the Maritime Provinces at the Quebec Conference.  These 72 Resolutions were set forth as the 
basis of the Confederation Debates.  Furthermore, these resolutions formed the basis of the 
British North America Act.  Id. 
 106. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION 1960-1978, 10 (1979).  The 
Canadian Constitution, the Constitution Act of 1887, is embodied in the British North America 
Act of 1867.  It is a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament.  In 1931, in the Statute of 
Westminister, the United Kingdom formally gave Canada its self-governing status.  Id. See also 
Canada, Dominion from Sea to Sea, (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.optonline.com/ 
comptons/ceo/00804_A.html>.  The BNA Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament and 
proclaimed in Canada.  The BNA Act provided for the Dominion of Canada to be divided into 
four provinces: Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.  Id.  See also National 
Library of Canada, Dominion of Canada, 1873 (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/confed/map1873.htm>. Manitoba in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, and Prince Edward 
Island in 1873 joined the dominion of Canada.  Id.  See Facts on Canada, Canada (visited Feb. 8 
2000) <http://canada.cio-bic.ga.ca/facts/canadagen-e.html>.  Since this time, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland have joined Canada.  The ten provinces and three territories 
that make-up Canada cover the world’s second largest country in terms of land mass.  Canada is 
second only to the Russian Federation.  Id. 
 107. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 24-25. 
 108. Id. at 26. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. P.B. WAITE, THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA 47-48 
(1963).  See also MCWHINNEY, supra note 106, at 12 (describing Section 91 of the BNA Act as a 
major source of legislative power). 
 112. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 29. 
 113. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. 
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in which loyalties and self-interests had not been built into separate provinces, 
was not a major contention point.  According to Gibbins, “there were no vested 
interests attached to provincial autonomy in what became Ontario and Quebec 
since governments did not exist in each province.”114 
Although most power was conferred to the national government in Section 
91 of the BNA Act, the federal features of the BNA Act were geared toward 
protecting French interests.115  According to Smiley, “the establishment of a 
federal system . . .was the response of the Fathers of the Confederation to the 
circumstances of cultural dualism and the most important provincial powers 
related directly to matters involving cultural differences.”116  Under the BNA 
Act, French Canadians were assured that their interests and culture were 
protected under the Confederation.117  The BNA Act delegated the primary 
French Canadian concerns, such as education, property, and civil rights to the 
Quebec Provincial Legislature.118  Quebec was allowed to keep its French 
based civil law system and was not forced to adopt the common law British 
judicial system.119  Also, the use of the French language in the legislature and 
the courts of Quebec, as well as the Parliament and the Federal Courts was 
constitutionally protected.120  The purpose was to remove sectional conflicts, 
stemming from French Canadian interests in Quebec from the rest of the 
interests of English Canadians, and keep them from impairing Canada’s 
movement forward.121 
a. Comparison of Constitutions Forming a Sense of Nationalism 
The main priority of the BNA Act was to protect and to promote French 
interests on a national scale.122  However, the BNA Act is not a constitution in 
the sense of the American Constitution; it was “merely a British statute passed 
for the purpose of confederating three of Britain’s colonies in British North 
America.”123  Therefore, it did not have the effect of nationalizing Canada as a 
symbol of cultural diversity.124  The intention was there but the symbolism and 
 
 114. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 29. 
 115. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 26. 
 116. DONALD V. SMILEY, THE CANADIAN POLITICAL NATIONALITY 6 (1987). 
 117. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 28. 
 118. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 32. 
 119. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 28. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. THOMAS A. HOCKIN, GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 15 (1975).  See also MCWHINNEY, 
supra note 106, at 10.  The colonies united were Lower Canada (Quebec), Upper Canada 
(Ontario), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.  The remaining provinces have joined Canada since 
that time.  Id. 
 124. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 28-29.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 34. 
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idealism behind it was inadequate.125  Residents of the United States have a 
patriotic intensity and belief in what the American Constitution stands for in 
American life and society.126  The American Civil War affirmed the supremacy 
of the national political community over sub national territorial units.127  The 
American Constitution is likewise a symbol of national identification.128  Being 
American is associated with strength and the national values of wealth, 
progress, and success.129  Leadership in the international community and the 
frontiers of science, technology, and space fosters nationalism.130  Canada, on 
the other hand, has not experienced a crisis like the Civil War to give the BNA 
Act such an identity to all Canadians.131 
Immediately following the Civil War, the United States experienced the 
weakness of territorial identification, especially in the Southern Region, where 
poverty, frustration, and military defeat made the Southern States different to 
the developing Northern and Western states.132  As the South evolved with 
social and economic change, it was able to embrace somewhat the essential 
features of nationalism.133  Canada, especially Quebec, is still dealing with 
regional identity.  For example, a person from Quebec considers himself or 
herself as a Quebecker, and not a Canadian.134  The ethnic and linguistic 
differences have inhibited growth of Canadian nationalism.135  To Quebec’s 
French Canadians, Canadian nationalism is seen as a threat to French 
culture.136  With the potential secession of Quebec, Canada is now dealing with 
an identity issue of Canadian unification, which may ultimately give meaning 
to the BNA Act to all Canadians. 
 
 125. Id. at 174. 
 126. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 170, 174. 
 127. See id. at 170; see also ANDERSON, supra note 68 at 79, 98.  The victory of the Unionist 
side of the War was a decisive victory for “nationalism, national unity, and national nullification.” 
Id. 
 128. Id. at 28. 
 129. See generally id. at 170. 
 130. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 170.  (As nationalism evolves “state boundaries are little more 
than lines on a map” and interstate mobility reduce “subnational territorial attachments.” (quoting 
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, IN THIRD CENTURY: AMERICA AS A POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY  92-93 
(1979)). 
 131. Id. at 174. 
 132. Id. at 170. 
 133. Id. at 171. (discussing how as territorial differences eroded between the South and North, 
the South has been able to share a common identity with the rest of the nation.  “The South was 
American long before it was Southern.”) (quoting C. VANN WOODWARD, IN THE SOUTH AND 
SECTIONAL POLITICS 174 (1967)). 
 134. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 177. 
 135. See id at 174. 
 136. See id. 
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3. From Quiet Revolution to Separatism 
Although French Canadians were given enumerated powers in the BNA 
Act regarding language and law, Canadian society and Quebec were “thus 
divided within itself, not only culturally, but economically as well.”137  While 
Quebec developed as a large manufacturing sector in wood products and 
leather, its technological and industrial development was slow as compared to 
the rest of Canada.138  People were employed as a large working class in the 
manufacturing area with little room for advancement.139  However, the English 
minority in Quebec held most of the managerial positions.140 
Contributing to the lagging economic conditions of Quebec was the 
unfavorable situation of education.141  For example, moving into the early 
1960s, Quebec did not have a Minister of Education or even a Department of 
Education within its provincial government.142  If a young person wanted to 
attend high school, fees had to be paid, which may have proved difficult for 
many families during this time of very slow economic growth.143  At this time, 
the French Canadians, making up the majority of the population of Quebec, 
had the fewest upper class and self-employed professionals.144  The French 
believed that they were dealing with an English dominated central government 
whose main concern was English advancement.145  The only solution seen at 
the time was a stronger, more active provincial government in Quebec.146 
The 1960s became a period known as the Quiet Revolution in which the 
Quebec government fought for a massive increase in activities of the state at 
the provincial level.147  The BNA Act delegated most powers to the central 
 
 137. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 87. 
 138. See generally id. at 87-88.  See also Industry Profiles, Canada: A Leader in Mining and 
Mineral Processing (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http:www.edc.ca/export/profile.html>.  Canada as a 
nation is the largest producer of hydroelectric power in the world.  The second largest 
hydroelectric powerplant in Canada, La Grande 2, is located in the James Bay Region of Quebec.  
This is among one of the top ten largest plants in the world.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 88. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See generally STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 89-90. 
 142. Id. at 90.  Public libraries were also scarce, as censorship was the norm in Quebec during 
this period. 
 143. See generally id. at 88-90. 
 144. Id.  See also RAYMOND BRENTON ET. AL., CULTURAL BOUNDARIES AND THE 
COHESION OF CANADA 149 (1980).  The average employment income of male workers in 1961 
was $5824 for English origin, $5374 for Irish origin and $3879 for French origin.  Income levels 
were indicative of standard of living levels in Quebec.  Id. 
 145. See generally supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
 146. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 89. 
 147. KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL 
UNITY 32-33 (1997).  See  DALE POSGATE & KENNETH MCROBERTS, QUEBEC: SOCIAL CHANGE 
AND POLITICAL CRISIS 94-101 (1976).  The Quiet Revolution was not only a change in political 
structure, but it was a change in ideologies, i.e. “beliefs about the purpose and character of society 
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government to avoid the mistakes of the American Constitution.148  However 
Quebec, with a similar identity to that of the Southern American society 
lagging behind the developments of the North, wanted more autonomy.149  The 
Canadian government sought a wide range of changes to the 1867 
Constitutional form of government that included: the withdrawal of the central 
government in areas of provincial control, higher equalization payments, 
participation in international relations, and an increase in fiscal control.150  
With the authority to make its own fiscal decisions, Quebec believed that it 
would be in a better position to have economic success, while promoting 
French Canadians from the working class to a more educated and respected 
class. 151 
In 1960, Jean Lesage’s Liberal Government took over power in Quebec 
during the Quiet Revolution.152  His government brought education, research, 
and exploration to the province of Quebec.153  During his tenure, a Ministry of 
Education and a Ministry of Cultural Affairs were appointed to advance French 
Canadian interests.154  A student loan program was also created so students 
could afford to be educated and earn a better living.155  His government 
lobbied American investors for capital investment in Quebec to provide 
economic stability.156  As changes in Quebec were made on a provincial level, 
 
and polity.”  Id. at 94.  The mainstream of French Canadians held these beliefs, as opposed to just 
being held by a few groups of intellectuals.  Id.  The French-Canadian society had been 
characterized as a “rural and agrarian” society.  Thus, the Quiet Revolution sparked the spirit in 
French-Canadians to become a “highly efficient technological society led by French-Canadians.”  
The goal was “catching up to social and economic development elsewhere.”  Id. at 95. 
 148. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 27. 
 149. See POSGATE & MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 145 (discussing Quebec’s lack of 
technological and economic development in the rest of Canada); GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 12. 
 150. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 40. 
 151. See POSGATE & MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 98-99.  According to Posgate, “the 
most frequently cited change has been the emergence of a new bureaucratic middle class, which 
arise primarily within the Church’s educational, health, and welfare institutions.”  Id.  These 
institutions needed to employ people to administer their services, which helped to create jobs and 
a new societal class.  Id.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 91. 
 152. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 33.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 92.  The 
Lesage government was reelected in November of 1962.  Following the 1962 election, most of 
Lesage’s achievements took place.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 33.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 93. 
 154. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 92-93. 
 155. Id. at 93. 
 156. Id.  During this time of economic turnaround in Quebec, “the privately owned hydro-
electric utilities were expropriated and turned over to the Quebec government as Hydro-Quebec. “  
Id.  This was Quebec’s strongest resource, and it now was set up as another revenue source for 
the government.  See also POSGATE & MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 100-01.  Nationalization 
of industries, like Hydro Quebec, provided new opportunities for French Canadians to attain 
managerial positions.  Before this nationalization of industries, English Canadians owned the 
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the Canadian federal government became increasingly insignificant to the 
people of Quebec.157  The Quiet Revolution led to the notion of “province 
building” and a barrier to “nation building” for the French Canadians in 
Quebec.158  The Quiet Revolution began a new period of “political tension as 
the province sought to assume greater control over its economy and 
institutions.”159 
4. Separatist Movement Begins 
Even with all of the success of the Lesage government, there was internal 
conflict in the government of Quebec during the 1960s.160  The Liberal Party 
split into two fronts: a nationalist front and a more moderate front.161  The 
Nationalists were the Separatists who viewed the BNA Act as a constitution 
safeguarding the position of the English minority in Quebec.162  The moderates 
saw the need for more provincial power but not to the extreme of secession.163  
For the first time, secession was a practical reality.  The Nationalists or 
Separatist party emphasized that secession was necessary due to the current 
situation of Quebec in relation to the rest of Canada.164  Quebec had become a 
minority in the realm of English-speaking Canada.165  At the same time, 
Quebec lost residents as the English fled the potential turmoil.166  Thus, as the 
population declined, so did Quebec’s power proportion in the central 
government.167  Quebec was left with a limited voice within a dominant 
 
corporations, thus they held most of the managerial positions in Quebec.  This had limited the 
growth of a middle class among French-Canadians in Quebec.  Id. 
 157. See id. at 93. 
 158. See STEVENSON, supra note 83, 104-05.  “Province building” is the process of the 
increasing in the power and importance of the provincial governments since the Confederation.  It 
can be viewed as “the defensive responses to policies of the central government.”  Id. at 104.  On 
the other hand, “nation building” is “an effort to shape a socioeconomic entity to which some 
degree is self-contained and self-directed by intensifying internal patterns of interdependence and 
by restricting or regulating ties with the outside world.”  Id. at 104-05.  Thus, there was emphasis 
on more of a central government instead of each particular provincial government. 
 159. Facts On Canada, Quebec (visited Feb. 8, 2000)  <http://canada.cio-bic.gc.ca/facts/ 
quebec-e.html>. 
 160. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 94. 
 161. Id. at 94. 
 162. Id. at 97 (discussing how the BNA Act protected the anglophone minority in Quebec and 
the Roman Catholic Church). 
 163. See id. at 94, 97; see also GIBBINS, supra note 2,at 40-41 (discussing how the moderates 
were calling for “greater provincial powers and responsibilities”). 
 164. See id. at 95-97. 
 165. STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 95-96. 
 166. Id. at 96-97. 
 167. Id. 
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English speaking government.168  The Separatists felt that the BNA Act could 
no longer protect French interests under these circumstances.169 
a. Separatism in Power 
During the 1960s, the Quebec government sought a restructuring of federal 
government and the abandonment of the 1867 centralized government 
formation.170  In 1976, Quebec’s demands for more provincial powers became 
a reality with the election of the PQ, Separatist party in Quebec.171  In 1968, 
the PQ party formed from various separatist organizations, such as the Union 
Nationale party.172  The PQ party ran on the platform of complete separation of 
Quebec from the rest of Canada.173  Although other provincial governments 
were in favor of more provincial power, they did not support a separatist 
movement and the fragmentation of Canada.174  Other provincial governments 
were in favor of more international trade powers not independence from 
Canada.175 
The leaders of the PQ party believed that secession was the only 
alternative for Quebec. Thus, referendums for secession were held in both 
1980 and 1995.176  The 1980 referendum was a meaningful defeat for the 
separatists with only forty-percent of voters in favor of secession.177  The PQ 
separatists came closer to getting a majority vote for independence in the 1995 
referendum.178  The 1995 referendum posed this question to Quebec voters: 
“do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a 
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. See generally STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 97.  With limited representation in the 
central government, the French protections in the BNA Act could no longer be assured from 
being assimilated into the English majority. 
 170. See  GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 40 (discussing the onset of the Quiet Revolution sought 
changes to the federal government in terms of more provincial power, however, the PQ Party 
called for the withdraw of Quebec from the confederation). 
 171. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 148. 
 172. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 160.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 94. 
 173. Id at 40.  See also STEVENSON, supra note 83, at 100.  The first government proposal 
was the adoption of the statute of the Charter of French language.  The statute eliminated English 
from official language status in the courts and legislature.  The Supreme Court struck this down.  
But in the private sector and education system, it was allowed to stand.  Id. 
 174. GIBBINS, supra note 2, at 40 (discussing how states wanted more provincial powers and 
responsibilities that had been limited in the BNA Act). 
 175. See id. at 40. 
 176. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3. 
 177. Id.  The 1980 referendum was only held in the province of Quebec.  Since the 1960s, the 
separatist movement appeared to “gain momentum.”  However, with forty percent of the votes the 
referendum was defeated. 
 178. The Wording of the Next Quebec Independence, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept 1, 
1998, available in 1998 WL 7441336. 
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scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed 
on June 12, 1995?”179  The question resulted in forty-nine and a half percent of 
voters saying yes, and only a fifty percent plus one majority was necessary for 
secession at the time.180  The referendum outcome caused a realization in the 
federal government that Quebec was serious.181 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF THE SECESSION OF 
QUEBEC 
A. Background of the Case 
The threatening result of the 1995 referendum proved to be enough 
provocation for the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, to present the 
issue of secession to the Supreme Court in Canada.182  In 1995, the Supreme 
Court was asked to give its opinion on the legalities of unilateral secession.183  
According to Prime Minister Chretien, the Quebec separatist government’s 
threat to act unilaterally “outside any reference to Canadian law” posed the 
“most serious risk for public order as well as the democratic rights of 
individual citizens.”184  The intention of the Canadian Central Government is 
to set ground rules for any future referendum.185 
The Supreme Court of Canada besides being “Canada’s court of final 
appeal” has the function of hearing references if asked by the Governor in 
Council.186  A reference is “to consider important questions of law such as the 
constitutionality or interpretation of federal or provincial legislation, or the 
division of powers between the federal and provincial levels of 
government.”187  In addition, “any point of law may be referred to this 
Court.”188  Thus, the unilateral secession of Quebec from the rest of Canada is 
considered a reference for the Supreme Court.189  References are rare, but the 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Canadian Ruling Preserves Stable Trade, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 26, 1998, at B2. 
 182. Id. 
 183. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3.  A federalist in Quebec with the Ottawa (federal or 
national) government filed suit in 1996 asking the Supreme Court of Canada for an opinion on the 
constitutional legality of a unilateral Quebec secession.  Id. 
 184. John Urquhart, A Unilateral Quebec Secession Is Barred, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1998, at 
A12. 
 185. See generally id. 
 186. The Supreme Court Today, References  (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/brochure/english/html/Today.html>.  The Supreme Court of Canada, which is Canada’s 
highest court, has jurisdiction that includes the civil law of Quebec as well as the common law of 
the rest of the provinces and territories in Canada.  Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3. 
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Court’s decision on such matters “can be of great importance.”190  Therefore, 
although the Court’s decision regarding the secession of Quebec is not legally 
binding, the decision does carry the weight of “the moral and legal authority of 
the court.”191 
1. Questions Presented to the Court 
On February 17, 1998, the Canadian Supreme Court began hearing 
arguments on whether Quebec has the right to unilaterally secede.192  Of the 
nine justices, three are from Quebec, including Chief Justice Antonio Lamer.193  
Three questions were referred to the Supreme Court. Question one dealt with 
the legality of unilateral secession under domestic law,  “[U]nder the 
Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature, or government 
of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?”194  
Question two considered whether Quebec had this right under the parameters 
of international law; “[d]oes international law give the National Assembly, 
legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally?”195 Here, the right to self-determination is at 
issue.196  The third question submitted to the Supreme Court was, “in the event 
of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the 
National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec to effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in 
Canada?”197  These questions go to the heart of the Canadian system of 
constitutional government and the future of Canada.198 
2. Decision Delivered by the Court 
On August 20, 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada gave guidance as to the 
underlying principles for the Canadian Constitution with respect to Quebec 
 
 190. The Supreme Court Today, References, supra note 186.  See also DePalma, supra note 5, 
at A3. Since 1892, only seventy four references have been issued by the Canadian Supreme 
Court.  Id. 
 191. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3. 
 192. What’s News, World-Wide, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1998, at A1.  
 193. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3. 
., Feb. 17, 1998, at A1.  
 193. DePalma, supra note 5, at A3. 
 194. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 2 (visited Aug 26, 1998) <http://www.droit. 
umontreal.ca/doc/csc-scc/en/rec/html/renvoi.en.html>.  This is the actual opinion of the court 
given on August 20, 1998.  To answer Question one, the Court examined the evolution of the 
Canadian Union and the principles underlying the Constitution.  Thus, these “principles of 
operation” were applied in the secession context.  Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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secession.199  The Court ruled that Quebec had no right to secede 
unilaterally.200  However, if a clear majority of Quebec residents supported a 
referendum vote to a clear question on secession, the rest of Canada, including 
the central government, the nine provincial governments, and the citizens of 
the rest of Canada would be obligated to enter into negotiations.201  The Court 
left it up to the politicians to decide the requirements of a clear question and a 
clear majority.202  The Supreme Court decision considered the legality of 
Quebec’s secession under three separate questions including domestic law, 
international law, and if necessary, conflict of laws.  Thus, the following 
provides what the Court determined under each of the above-mentioned 
questions. 
a. Question One: Right to Secede under Domestic Law 
The Supreme Court examined the underlying principles of the Canadian 
Constitution: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and 
respect for minorities.203  As noted before, the BNA Act was an act of nation 
building, the first step in the transition from colonies to a unified and 
independent political state.204  In this case, the Court focused upon the 
operation of constitutional principles in the secession context.205  The Canadian 
Constitution does not explicitly prohibit or allow a province to secede from the 
Confederation.206  However, the Court noted that secession would alter 
Canada, as it is known today internationally.207 
 
 199. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 148. 
 200. Id. at  86. See also Jeffrey Simpson, The Court Finds the Right Tradeoff, GLOBE & 
MAIL, Aug. 25, 1998, at A12. 
 201. Simpson, supra note 200, at A12. 
 202. Id.  The Supreme Court’s vague requirement of a clear majority to a clear question has 
initiated much debate among the political parties.  The PQ party believes a clear majority means 
fifty percent plus one, but the current Prime Minister of Canada Chretien believes it would take a 
more convincing margin.  For example, a recent referendum proposed secession of Nevis from St. 
Kitts, two Caribbean islands joined by the British more than 100 years ago, a clear question was 
presented to the voters: “Do you approve of the Nevis secession bill and Nevis becoming an 
independent state separate from St. Kitts?”  A two-thirds majority was necessary for the 
referendum to pass.  Secession failed in Nevis with sixty-two percent of citizens voting “yes.”  
This is an example of a “clear majority to a clear question”.  Id. 
 203. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 49. 
 204. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (defining “nation building”);  supra 
notes 106-14 and accompanying text (discussing BNA Act’s impact on Canada). 
 205. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 49. 
 206. Id. at 84. 
 207. Id. at 59.  The Court looks at the costs of secession not only for Quebec but also for 
Canada with an uncertain identity.  After more than a century of being a cultural diverse society, 
Canada would lose a major component of its diversity.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] NO SUCCESS IN SECESSION 767 
A unilateral secession would undoubtedly alter the present constitutional 
arrangement quite drastically.208  As stated in the Court’s opinion, “the right to 
secede unilaterally means the right to achieve secession without prior 
negotiations or approval of the federal government of Canada, and the other 
provinces.”209  The Court reasoned, although the democracy principle in the 
Constitution gives the Separatists in Quebec the right to secede, negotiations 
are necessary to respect the interests of the federal government, Quebec, and 
the other provinces as well as the rights of all Canadians inside and outside the 
borders of Quebec.210  Thus, requiring a clear majority of Quebec citizens in 
favor of secession would impose obligations upon all Canadians, including the 
central and provincial governments, to negotiate the secession of Quebec from 
the rest of Canada.211  As a democracy, the Canadian Government cannot 
ignore the clear expression of the citizens of Quebec that they no longer wish 
to remain in Canada.212  Similarly, Quebec must respect the interdependence of 
the provinces by participating in negotiations with the rest of Canada for 
successful secession.213 
The vision of the Canadian founding fathers expressed the advantages of 
interdependence among the provinces under a central government.214  The 
Attorney General from Saskatchewan expanded on this theme from the 
founding fathers in his oral submission to the Canadian Supreme Court as 
follows: 
A nation is built when the communities that comprise it make commitments to 
it, when they forego chances and opportunities on behalf of a nation,. . .when 
the communities that comprise it make compromises, when they offer each 
other guarantees, when they make transfers and perhaps most pointedly, when 
they receive from others the benefits of national solidarity.  The threads of a 
thousand acts of accommodations are the fabric of a nation215 
However, if a majority of the people of Quebec expressed their clear intent to 
secede, negotiations would follow, without Quebec, and the national solidarity 
 
 208. See id. at 83, 84. 
 209. See id. at 86. 
 210. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note, 194 at 92.  “Canada as a whole is 
also a democratic community in which citizens construct and achieve goals on a national scale 
through a federal government acting within the limits of its jurisdiction.”  Id.  Even though 
democracy expresses the sovereign will of the people, Quebec would have to respect the 
interdependence of achieving national goals and participate in negotiations with the rest of 
Canada. 
 211. Id. at 66. 
 212. Id. at 92. 
 213. See id. at 92, 95. 
 214. Id.  at 96. 
 215. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 96.  The interdependence 
argument emphasized how the founders of the Confederation viewed the Canadian nation, where 
national interests are put first before state interests. 
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of Canada would be weakened.216  After more than a century of Confederation, 
a high level of integration in economic, political, and social institutions across 
Canada has occurred.217  Therefore, the Court considered the difficulties in 
negotiations concerning the national debt, the national economy, and the 
boundaries of Quebec with the rest of Canada.218  Consequently, the 
constitutional principles, which united Canada as a nation, could be used to 
dissolve Quebec in the negotiations following a potential referendum.219 
b. Question Two: The Right of Secession under International Law 
The Court also considered the existence or non-existence of a right of 
unilateral secession by a province of Canada in the context of international 
law.  The Court observed that international law does not explicitly imply a 
right to secession nor deny a right to secession to be permitted under the right 
of self-determination.220  However, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations And Co-Operation Among 
States In Accordance With The Charter of the United Nations recognizes that 
nations belonging to the United Nations respect the principle of the self-
determination of peoples.221  It provides in part, “[a]ll peoples have the right 
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has 
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter.”222 
 
 216. See id. at 96, 97. 
 217. See id. at 96. 
 218. Id. at 96, 97. 
 219. See id. at 148.  In negotiations for secession, the Court would use the same principles of 
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for minorities to negotiate 
the secession of Quebec from the rest of Canada.  Id.  Both Quebec and the rest of Canada would 
be obliged to participate in “good faith” recognizing these principles.  Id. at 92, 95.  See also 
Kenneth McRoberts, The Supreme Court’s Ruling: Putting Things Straight, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 
21, 1998, at A19. 
 220. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 112. 
 221. MILAN SAHOVIC ed., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY 
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 442 (1972). 
 222. Id.  An excerpt of the Declaration On Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States In Accordance With the Charter Of The 
United Nations proclaims that: 
 By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right 
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, and every State has 
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter. 
Id. 
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The Court addressed whether the citizens of Quebec constitute a “peoples” 
under international law.223  “Peoples” are a group with an identity, stemming 
from a common language or common traditions that is separate from the rest of 
the country’s population.224  The French Canadians of Quebec are a minority in 
Canada based on their French language and culture.225  Quebec citizens are not 
considered colonial and oppressed peoples.226  Therefore, the population of 
Quebec cannot claim to be denied access to the government since they have 
proportionate representation in the federal government.227  Additionally, the 
citizens of Quebec have the freedom to participate in economic, social, and 
political endeavors throughout the rest of Canada and the world.228  Residents 
have the freedom to make political choices.  Thus, the “peoples” composing 
the population of Quebec are not oppressed or denied meaningful access to 
government.  In considering these factors, the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded that under international law, the right to self-determination does not 
apply to the residents of Quebec.229 
In light of the answers to Question one and Question two, the Court found 
no conflict between domestic and international law.230 
B. Significance of the Supreme Court’s Decision In Respect to Canada 
The Court’s decision under domestic and international law sends a 
message to Quebec Separatists that secession from Canada would be difficult.  
The legal framework of a clear majority of voters to a clear question of 
secession is a tough legal obstacle for Quebec to overcome before declaring its 
 
The General Assembly of the United Nations passed this declaration as UN General Assembly 
2625 (XXV), 1883rd Plenary Meeting, 24th Oct. 1970.  See also Neil Finkelstein et al., Does 
Quebec Have a Right to Secede at International Law?, 74 CANADIAN B. REV. 240 (1993).  “The 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is the most important modern 
document in conventional international law on the right to self-determination.”  Id.  This 
Declaration was the result of a Special Committee who wanted to expand “the scope of the 
principle of self-determination to justify secession where the metropolitan State has, through 
discriminatory behavior, violated the secessionist group’s right to political representation.”  Id. 
 223. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text. 
 224. See infra notes 282-93 and accompanying text (expanding on the objective and 
subjective criteria of the determination of a “peoples”). 
 225. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text; see also infra note 284 and 
accompanying text. 
 226. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. 
 227. Id.  Quebec is represented in all three branches of government including legislative, 
executive, and judicial institutions. 
 228. See generally id. 
 229. Id.  This section discusses in further detail why Quebec does not have a right to 
secession under international law. 
 230. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 147. 
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independent status.231  Recognizing the seriousness of the consequences of 
secession, Quebec must clearly state its will to become an independent state.232  
The definition of secession used by the Court states, “[s]ecession is the effort 
of a group or section of a state to withdraw itself from the political and 
constitutional authority of that state, with a view to achieving statehood for a 
new territorial unit on the international plane.”233  From the standpoint of the 
Court, the citizens of Quebec need to reflect on exactly what they are about to 
embark on.234 
Quebec is an important province to the composition of Canada.235  It has 
unique and diverse features that add character to Canada.236  The Court cannot 
make Quebec stay, but the decision will make it a difficult process for Quebec 
to achieve secession to preserve the order and stability that the Constitution 
represents.237  Since 1867, Canada has been built upon the principles of 
interdependence in respect to economics, politics, and social institutions.238  
The Court reasoned that Quebec is too important to the identity of Canada to 
withdraw itself from the Confederation without a clear showing by the citizens 
of Quebec of their intent to leave.239  If the intent is clear by the majority of the 
people of Quebec, negotiations with all participants in the Confederation of 
Canada will take place.240 
The Supreme Court added a “new weapon” against secession by not only 
requiring a clear majority to a clear question, but also by requiring that all 
Canadians take part in the negotiations.241  Thus, the negotiations could prove 
difficult after more than a century of integration in reference to dividing the 
national debt and assets of Canada.242  A major contention point would be the 
aboriginal population of Quebec, such as the Cree Indians in northern 
 
 231. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 87.  The Court wants the 
people voting for secession to know exactly what they are doing.  They will no longer be a part of 
the Canadian Confederation.  See id. 
 233. See  id. at 83. 
 234. See  id. at 87. 
 235. See  id. at 96. 
 236. Id. at 59.  See also DePalma, supra note 6, at A34.  For example, Quebec provides a 
unique culture in respect to its French language and French culture, like its own television shows. 
 237. See generally Kenneth McRoberts, The Supreme Court’s Ruling: Putting Things 
Straight, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 21, 1998, at A19.  See also DePalma, supra note 5, at A3.  
Secession of Quebec would be “difficult, painful, and costly.”  According to the justices, “[T]he 
devil would be in the details.”  Id. 
 238. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Quebec Just Can’t Quit, supra note 18, at O14. 
 241. Josee Legault, How to Deny Quebec’s Right to Self-Determination With the Supreme 
Court’s Opinion: We have Entered the Realm of Colonial Federalism, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 21, 
1998, A19. 
 242. See id; see also Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 96. 
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Quebec.243  The Cree Indians assert that with Quebec independence, they 
would resist the imposition of Quebec’s sovereignty over them.244  Thus, the 
boundary issue of Quebec would be a very complex issue to negotiate with 
three different groups, Canadians, Quebeckers, and the Crees, arguing for the 
right to the same land. 
On January 26, 1996, Lucien Bouchard, leader of the PQ Separatist party 
and current Premier of Quebec claimed the Court’s decision as a victory for 
legitimizing secession.245  Although the Court provided the legal framework 
for Quebec to secede from the union, it offered guidance for maintaining a 
unified Canada.246  The holding of the Court emphasized that the legal 
requirements of a successful secession from Canada would not be simple.247  
According to Prime Minister Chretien, “Canada is not a prison. . .but we have 
established a barrier you have to go over.  Canadians will never force anyone 
to stay.  It is not their nature.”248  Essentially the Court is saying that Canada is 
not easily divisible, only a strong Canada brought together with shared 
principles will be successful.249  Thus, Quebec is necessary to the success of 
Canada as a nation. 
1. What Is A Clear Question and A Clear Majority   
The Canadian Supreme Court stresses in its opinion at least thirteen times 
that before negotiation, a referendum must obtain a “clear majority” and refers 
thirteen times to a “clear expression” and twice to a “clear repudiation of the 
existing constitutional order” as well as once to a “strong majority.”250  The 
 
 243. See MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 231-33, 270-71. 
 244. See id. at 231; see also Supreme Court of Canada Confirms Cree Position on Unilateral 
Secession, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 20, 1998. (discussing the situation of the aboriginals, like the 
Cree Indians in relation to Quebec’s secession). 
 245. See Quebec Separatists Hail Ruling, Canada’s Highest Court Rejected Unilateral 
Secession, But Said Other Provinces Would Likely Negotiate If Most Quebeckers Want Out, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 22, 1998, at A15;  see also Lucien Bouchard (visited Oct. 17 1999) 
<http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWSQuebecElection/bouchard.html>. 
 246. See MCROBERTS, supra note 237, at A19. 
 247. See generally DePalma, supra note 5, at A4.  In this article, DePalma recaps the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s decision that that “separation would be difficult, painful, and costly.”  
Id. 
 248. Edward Greenspon & Anne McIlroy, Quebec Premier says Supreme Court’s Ruling 
Helps Sovereigntists; Chretien Insists it Imposes a Crucial Barrier to Secession, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Aug. 22, 1998, at A1. 
 249. See generally id.  See also Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 96-97. 
 250. See Minister Dion Stresses the Need to Respect the Supreme Court’s Opinion in its 
Entirety, CAN. NEWSWIRE (visited Aug. 26, 1998) <www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia>.  Minister Dion is 
the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs.  He sent an open letter to Quebec Premier Lucein 
Bouchard, leader of the Separatist Party, regarding his opinion of the Court’s ruling.  He felt that 
Bouchard had not taken it seriously only as legitimizing his claim of secession.  Minister Dion 
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size of the majority must be sufficient to legitimize such a radical change that 
would commit not just present citizens of Quebec but the future generations 
causing to them give up Canadian citizenship and a prosperous and developed 
nation.251  Therefore, a clear majority is necessary. 
A clear majority “is a question of mathematics that adds up to a united 
Canada.”252  Prime Minister Chretien and the National Assembly believe that a 
successful referendum would require the support of about sixty-six percent of 
all voters in Quebec who would have to vote yes to a question on secession.253  
This would mean that at least eighty percent of all French Canadians in Quebec 
based on the make-up of the population would have to vote yes to secession.254  
In the 1995 sovereignty referendum, about sixty percent of French Canadians 
voted in favor of secession.255  In formulating a clear question, the Court 
rejected the vagueness of the previous referendum questions.256  A clear 
question could not refer to secession as a “sovereignty association” or 
“sovereignty with an offer of political and economic partnership.”257  The 
Court found it imperative that voters know exactly what they were doing: 
separating from the rest of Canada.258  Therefore, the question must be 
explicitly clear, so there is no ambiguity regarding what the people of Quebec 
are deciding for their future status.259 
The Supreme Court of Canada with its authority has stated that Quebec is 
too important to the rest of Canada to secede without all Canadians taking a 
 
urges Bouchard actually to examine the opinion, especially the difficulty in achieving the hurdles 
of the legal requirements like the clear question, clear majority, and good faith negotiations.  Id. 
 251. See generally id. 
 252. See LuAnn LaSalle, It’s a Question of Mathematics That Adds Up to a United Canada, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Aug. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7441183. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id.  In the 1995 Referendum, the Separatists in total received 49.4 % of the vote.  Id. 
 256. The Wording of the Next Quebec Independence, supra note 178.  The 1995 referendum 
question contained forty words and asked, ‘[D]o you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, 
after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within 
the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed June 12, 1995?”  
Id.  According to Prime Minister Chretien, the question was so unclear that “many people who 
voted “yes” didn’t understand what they were endorsing.”  Id. 
 257. See generally Minister Dion Stresses the Need to Respect the Supreme Court’s Opinion 
in its Entirety, supra note 250.  Here, the Minister discusses the fact that Lucien Bouchard must 
ask a question that clearly provides that “Quebeckers want to give up Canada.”  Thus, 
negotiations with the rest of Canada could not take place if the negotiations were based on vague 
concepts as “sovereignty-association” or “sovereignty with an offer of political and economic 
partnership.”  Id. 
 258. Id.  See also Greenspoon and McIlroy, supra note 248, at A1.  The referendum question 
must get at the heart of what secession is.  Secession is the complete withdrawal from the 
Canadian Confederation.  There is no partnership or association with secession.  Id. 
 259. Id. 
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part in its withdrawal.260  Quebec has been there from the creation of Canada 
and it plays a large role as part of the identity of Canada.261  Canada is a 
confederation that embraces diversity and is a symbol to the rest of the world 
that diversity can work and even flourish within the borders of one nation.262  
The Supreme Court of Canada has forced the people of Quebec to reflect on 
what Quebec means to Canada. 
IV. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Supreme Court determined the legality of Quebec’s secession under 
international law.  In this section, the right of secession under international law 
is further examined in terms of principles and its application in more detail to 
Quebec’s situation.  International law applies to the potential secession of 
Quebec because it involves the right of self-determination, which all nations 
are to respect.263 
A. The Right to Self-determination Contrary to “Territorial Integrity” 
Under international law, the Canadian Supreme Court examined the 
legitimacy of Quebec’s claim of secession as a right to self-determination.264  
The United Nations Charter recognizes both a “peoples” right to self-
determination and the right of a sovereign state’s territorial integrity.265  
Assertions of self-determination stem from the fact that many states are 
multiethnic.266  Besides Canada, major European powers are also faced with 
 
 260. See Quebec Can’t Just Quit, supra note 18; supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Slowing Secession Quebec will have to Negotiate a Divorce from Canada, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZ., Aug. 31, 1998, at A10. 
 263. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 83.  “It is also argued that 
international law is a relevant standard by which the legality of a purported act of secession may 
be measured.”  Id.; see infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.  In the United Nations Charter, 
the right of self-determination is to be respected by all nations; therefore, this is a facet of 
international law. 
 264. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 194, at 111. 
 265. See U.N. CHARTER. art. 1, para. 2. “The Purposes of the United Nations are: (2) to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principles of equal rights 
and self -determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace.”  See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (stating the principle of “territorial integrity.”)  (see 
also in Finkelstein, supra note 222, at 238. “The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in 1945, 
was the first international law instrument to formally recognize the concept of self-
determination.”).  See Dr. Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model Declaration On The 
Right Of Secession, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 16 (1998).  The U.N. Charter states the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.  The UN Charter does not define either “self-
determination” or “peoples”.  See supra notes 220-22. Thus, to understand concepts, a person 
may look to declarations of the United Nations to find further explanation of the Charter 
concepts. 
 266. Schwartz, supra note 265, at 16. 
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secessionist movements, including the Scots, Irish, and Welsh in the United 
Kingdom and Basques and Catalans of Spain.267  As many states throughout 
the world invoke their right of self-determination to claim independent 
statehood, secession in general has the potential to disrupt the present world 
order.268  In the international community, secession is regarded as a last resort 
for peoples in an oppressive situation.269 
The wider international community has an interest in limiting the 
fragmentation of states.270  The transaction costs of negotiating and monitoring 
international agreements rise as more states enter the international scene.271  
Further, trying to achieve the goals of the international community like the 
negotiation of free trade agreements and the regulation of military weapons 
becomes more difficult with a greater number of states.  The best interest of the 
international order is to limit the number of states and make globalization 
possible.272  “Secession in general is only valid as a last resort” as states have a 
particular place in the “web of international legal and political 
relationships.”273 
A major principle of international law is the respect of sovereignty of 
existing states or “territorial integrity” as recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations.274  Territorial integrity involves the right of an existing state to 
be free of external interference from other states on its territory.275  However, 
recognition is contrary to the principle of territorial sovereignty.276  
Recognition is the acceptance of a new state by the international community of 
the independence of the state.277  Therefore, another state is interfering in an 
existing, sovereign state’s control over its own affairs within its boundaries.  
 
 267. Id. at 44. 
 268. Id. at 2. 
 269. Id. at 18-19. 
 270. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial 
Age, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1996). 
 271. Schwartz & Waywood, supra note 265, at 2. 
 272. Id. at 2. 
 273. Id. at 18-19. 
 274. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
 275. BRANAMIR M. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (1984). 
 276. Finkelstein, supra note 222, at 233.  To be a state in international law, an entity “should 
possess the following qualifications: a. a permanent population; b. a defined territory; c. 
government .  .  .; d. capacity to enter into relations with other states.”  Id. at 230.  (The 
qualifications are quoted from Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention). 
 277. JANKOVIC, supra note 275, at 97.  Recognition has been argued as either a political and 
diplomatic or legal matter between states.  Id. at 99.  Recognition is the formal act of 
acknowledging a new state and its legal existence in the international community.  Id. at 98.  See 
generally, Gerald McGinley, “The Creation and Recognition of States” in PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 207 (Sam Blay et al. eds., 1997).  Non-
recognition of a state keeps a state from entering into many international agreements and 
functioning as a world player.  Id. 
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For these reasons, recognition of separatist movements is limited to “a 
secessionist unit who have a history of oppression and discrimination.”278 
B. International Law applied to Quebec’s Claim of Secession 
The right to self-determination as expressed by the United Nations Charter 
is limited to “peoples.”279  Not every ethnic, religious, or linguistic group can 
claim statehood without the international system of peace and security being 
threatened.280  “Peoples” are a group with a self-defined identity from the rest 
of the country.281  Objective criteria for the determination of a “peoples” are a 
group with “common traditions, common language, common religion, and - 
perhaps most important - common enemies.”282  Applied to Quebec, the 
common French language and political traditions would arguably satisfy the 
objective criteria of a “people.”283  However, people other than French-
speaking people live in Quebec, like English-speaking people and the 
aboriginal population, such as the Cree Indians.284  This shows that there is a 
lack of homogeneity in the Quebec population.285  If a “peoples” were only 
defined on the objective criteria, each of these groups could make a claim of 
self-determination as a “people.”286  That is why more is needed than merely 
an objective belief to justify the exercise of self-determination.  A subjective 
 
 278. Finkelstein, supra note 223,at 231-33.  “The rights of existing or metropolitan, states to 
preserve their territorial integrity and sovereignty are jealously protected at international law . . . .  
As a result, international law, which consists of conventions and practices of states and state-run 
institutions, treats premature recognition of prospective states as an unlawful violation of 
territorial integrity.  The international community may be entitled to intervene and recognize the 
secessionist unit in some situations where there has been a history of oppression and 
discrimination.”  Id. 
 279. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. 
 280. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1993).  In 1992, the U.N. Secretary-
General warned about the dangers of separatist movements.  “Yet if every ethnic, religious or 
linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation and peace, security 
and economic well-being for all would become even more difficult to achieve.”  Id. 
 281. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 222, at 248-49. 
 282. Id. at 248. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 249.  See also Supreme Court of Canada Confirms Cree Position on Unilateral 
Secession, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 20, 1998 (discussing the situation of the aboriginals, like the 
Cree Indians in relation to Quebec’s secession).  See Facts on Canada, French Language and 
Identity: A Vibrant Presence (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://canada.cio-bic.gc.ca/facts/frenchid-
e.html> (“According to the 1991 census, French is the mother tongue of 82% of Quebec’s 
population and is spoken at home by 83% of Quebeckers.”).  Facts on Canada, Canada (visited 
Feb. 8, 2000) <http://canada.cio-bic.gc.ca/facts/canadagen-e.html>.  In Canada, “English is the 
mother tongue of about 59% of Canadians, and French is the first language of 23% of the 
population.”  The Official Languages Act makes English and French the official languages of 
Canada.  Id. 
 285. Id.  Quebec’s population includes English, French, and natives. 
 286. See generally id. at 248-49. 
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belief of the people requires that they believe the only way to prosper is as an 
independent state.287 
The subjective criteria used to designate a “people” are 1) whether the 
people have manifested an unequivocal will to live together, and 2) have 
expressed a desire be recognized as distinct.288  An election or referendums are 
tools to determine the criteria.289  For example, referendums used in the Baltic 
States’ declarations of independence included ninety percent of Lithuanians, 
seventy-eight percent of Estonians, and seventy-four percent of Lativans.290  
These overwhelming results indicate an unequivocal will to live together as a 
sovereign state.291  In 1991, ninety-three percent of Croatians favored complete 
secession from Yugoslavia.292  In contrast, the results of both Quebec’s 
previous referendums were under fifty percent.293  In comparing these 
statistics, it is difficult to make the argument under both the objective criteria, 
which lack homogeneity, and the subjective criteria, which lack an expressed 
clear intent of secession, that the people of Quebec have a right to self-
determination. 
The international community has recognized the secessions of Bangladesh 
from Pakistan, the Baltic States from the former U.S.S.R., and Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercogovina from former Yugoslavia.294  For example, 
the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercogovina from Yugoslavia 
is a clear example of a successful secession based upon the right to self-
determination.295  Here, the states seceding were “politically disempowered 
and discriminated against.”296  There were few problems with recognition 
because ethnic cleansing was used as an attempt by the Yugoslav federal 
military to increase Serbian territory by attempting to force all non-Serbs out 
of territories, which were occupied by Serbs or contiguous to the Yugoslav 
republic.297 
 
 287. Id at 249-50. 
 288. See Finkelstein, supra note 222, at 248. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 250. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. 
 294. See Finkelstein, supra note 222, at 245.  These are the examples of successful 
secessionist movements based upon the right of self-determination. Id. 
 295. Id. at 246. (quoting Eastwood, “it represents the first time widespread international state 
practice has favoured secession movements still engaged in armed struggle for independence 
outside the colonial context.”).  Id. 
 296. See id. at 247.  When a political system enforces internal discrimination, the state may be 
found to have violated the right to self-determination.  The right to be politically represented has 
been taken away.  Id. 
 297. Id. 
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In these previous examples, the facts supporting secession are clearly 
stronger than the present situation in Quebec.298  The same conditions do not 
exist in Canada.  Quebec is fairly represented within the framework of the 
federal government.299  Quebec’s politicians have dominated the office of 
Prime Minister since 1948 for about thirty-four of the last forty-seven years.300  
And three of the nine justices on the Supreme Court are reserved for 
Quebecois, even though the population of Quebec makes up only one-quarter 
of the population.301  In addition, the Constitution Act 1982 reaffirmed 
Canada’s commitment to the protection of minority rights in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.302  With all of these protections and no 
evidence of human rights violations, Quebec lacks a serious claim to secession 
under international law, where secession is generally only recognized as a last 
resort.303 
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC AND CANADA 
The Supreme Court’s decision will have a significant impact on not only 
Quebec’s future but also the future of Canada as a nation.  Two alternatives are 
possible for the future of Canada and Quebec: Quebec secedes from Canada, 
assuming the conditions set forth by the Supreme Court are met or Quebec 
could stay as a part of Canada.  After discussing these two alternatives for the 
future of Quebec and Canada, the most likely alternative will be discussed. 
 
 298. Id. at 255.  Another example is Pakistan.  “West Pakistan exercised political dominance 
over East Pakistan and exploited its natural resources.”  Id. at 253.  West Pakistan during the 
Civil War with East Pakistan practiced genocide.  Id.  “West Pakistan engaged in clear human 
rights’ violations, . . . a wholesale denial of human rights as a result of a deliberate policy of the 
existing state.”  Id.  East Pakistan had a valid claim of self-determination.  Id. 
 299. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Finkelstein, supra notes 222 & 255 (construing R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 5).  Pursuant 
to the Supreme Court Act, three of the nine justices on the Supreme Court of Canada were 
appointed from the bar of Quebec.  Id. 
 301. See id. (stating Quebec is the only province with this entitlement).  In addition, Quebec’s 
one third of the judges on the Court exceeds its proportionate share of the Canadian population by 
about twenty-five percent. 
 302. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).  
In section 16, the Charter recognized “English and French are the official languages of Canada 
and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the 
Parliament and government of Canada.”  See also Facts on Canada, Multiculturalism (visited 
Feb. 10, 2000) <http://canada.cio-bic.gc.ca/facts/canadagen-e.html>.  Canada became the first 
country to adopt a multiculturalism policy.  The policy affirms that Canada “recognizes and 
values its rich ethnic and racial diversity.”  Id. 
 303. See supra notes 237-52 and accompanying text. 
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1. Secession of Quebec from Canada 
Under international law standards, Quebec lacks a serious claim of a 
unilateral declaration of independence from Canada.304  The Separatist leaders 
hope that after a declaration of independence, the rest of the world would 
recognize the reality of Quebec as an independent republic.305  However, the 
principles of non-recognition would apply to the secession of Quebec.  
Secession is used in situations of last resort for oppressed and politically 
discriminated people.306  Quebec does not fit this description; therefore, it is 
unlikely that the international community would be willing to recognize 
Quebec.  Since countries from around the world are heavily invested in the 
Canadian economy, it is likely that many countries would be extremely 
cautious of offending the Canadian government by recognizing Quebec.307  
Furthermore, recognizing Quebec without just cause would violate the 
sovereignty of Canada.308  For example, the United States’ position on the 
secession of Quebec has been one of strict nonintervention, i.e. without the 
consent of Canada, it is unlikely that the United States would recognize an 
independent Quebec.309 
Without the recognition of the United States, Quebec would arguably 
experience economic hardships.310  The United States is Canada’s largest 
trading partner through the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which allows for freedom of movement of goods between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico.311  As a sovereign country outside of Canada and without 
the recognition of the United States, Quebec would lose its most significant 
trading partner. 
However, if Quebec were to satisfy the legal requirements set out by the 
Supreme Court, Canada would be obligated to enter into good faith 
negotiations with Quebec.312  It is possible that Canada’s recognition of 
Quebec’s independence would encourage other states, including the United 
 
 304. See id. 
 305. See Schwartz & Waywood, supra note 265, at 12.  See Anthony DePalma, Vote in 
Quebec May Be Last Fling With Secession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1998, at A1, A10. 
 306. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text. 
 307. See ROBERT A. YOUNG, THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA 
112-13 (1995). 
 308. See Finkelstein et al., supra note 222, at 230. 
 309. DePalma, supra note 5, at A4. 
 310. See infra notes 311, 317-29 and accompanying text. 
 311. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 280, at 1408-11, 1546-48 (expanding on the treaty of 
NAFTA, including dispute settlements and its principle features).  Further, NAFTA eliminates 
“barriers to agricultural, manufacturing, and services trade, to remove investment restrictions, and 
to protect effectively intellectual property rights.”  Id. at 1409.  See generally CIA-The World 
Fact Book, Canada (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ca. 
html>.  NAFTA became effective in 1994. 
 312. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. 
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States, to be more willing to recognize Quebec.  Quebec, as an independent 
nation, would possibly be able to join trade agreements as a recognized 
independent state depending on the provisions of the treaties, like a Quebec-
Canada Partnership.313  However, even with a negotiated secession, Canada 
may object to the addition of Quebec as a party to NAFTA as an independent 
sovereign.314  Further Canada may erect trade barriers against Quebec to stifle 
its trading opportunities.315  Consequently, the United States would be in a 
position of choosing whether to protect NAFTA by preventing these trade 
barriers.316 
Another possibility following secession negotiations is the division of 
Quebec’s assets among the rest of Canada by the Canadian government.317  
Also, Canada without Quebec would now have a smaller economy and 
population, therefore, Canada might not be able to offer the same amount and 
quantity of goods that the United States had expected.318  As a result, the 
United States could consider this a fundamental change in circumstances and 
re-negotiate the trade agreements to the possible disadvantage of Canada as a 
new smaller nation.319 
Not only may Quebec be negatively affected by finding itself without trade 
partners, but also as an independent state, it would no longer enjoy the 
protected status of being part of the eighth largest economy as a province 
within Canada.320  Unlike the benefits of a common integrated economy where 
an international economic downturn would be absorbed by all provinces to 
lessen the effects under secession, Quebec would now stand-alone.321  After 
secession, the people of Quebec would possibly no longer maintain their status 
as Canadian citizens.322  Thus, they would no longer be entitled to receive the 
 
 313. See generally MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 225-26. 
 314. See YOUNG, supra note 307, at 111. 
 315. See generally MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 257. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 270 (discussing Quebec as part of Canada shares in an integrated community and 
economy).  See also Richard H. Leach, Canadian Federalism Revisited in CANADIAN 
FEDERALISM FROM CRISIS TO CONSTITUTION 15 (Harold Walker et al. eds., 1984). 
 318. Schwartz & Waywood, supra note 265, at 3.  See generally MCROBERTS, supra note 
147, at 272. 
 319. See Jan Linehan, Law of Treaties, in Public INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 111-12 (Sam Blay et al. eds., 1997); see also YOUNG, supra note 307, at 37.  
Without Quebec’s contribution to the economy, Canada as a nation may have less to offer in trade 
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 320. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 273. 
 321. Schwartz & Waywood, supra note 265, at 2.  See also Leach, supra note 317, at 15 
(discussing how protectionist measures of the provinces stifle the benefits of an integrated 
economy). 
 322. See YOUNG, supra note 307, at 110. 
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benefits of Canadian citizenship, like federally funded programs.323  To 
Canada’s detriment, tax burdens on its citizens would increase by 3.3% in 
order to provide the current level of government services without the 
contribution of Quebec.324  In addition, Quebec would not receive the benefits 
of the strong economic growth of Canada, such as social benefits, and the right 
to vote in Canadian elections.325 
Furthermore, Quebec will find itself in control of all levels of its economic 
development and growth.326  This may result with Quebec finding itself with 
its fair share of the national debt.  Quebec as part of Canada contributed to the 
national debt of Canada and with secession, the debt may be divided.327  
Following the declaration of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, Quebec would be 
allocated an “equitable portion” of debt.328  Furthermore, Quebec as a newly 
independent nation would lose its bargaining strength and international 
prominence in the international community itself when compared to the 
influence it had as part of Canada.329  Therefore, Quebec may find it more 
difficult to find favorable trading agreements because potential trading partners 
would be unsure of Quebec’s economic stability. 
The secession of Quebec from Canada would be costly for Quebec as a 
province and the rest of Canada.330  The supporters of secession in Quebec 
view independence as associated with greater opportunities to express their 
unique culture outside the sphere of the English dominant society.331  
However, each citizen of Quebec and citizens in the rest of Canada will pay a 
price for secession.332  The average Quebec citizen may find that his or her 
personal, educational, and professional opportunities will decrease because 
 
 323. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 273.  See also YOUNG, supra note 307, at 32.  As a 
sovereign state, Quebec would collect all its taxes within its borders.  There would be no more 
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 324. A Joint Venture: The Economics of Constitutional Options, ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF 
CANADA, 84-85 (1991), in YOUNG, supra note 307, at 32. 
 325. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 273. 
 326. See YOUNG, supra note 307, at 32. 
 327. MCROBERTS, supra note 147, at 270. 
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these resources will be smaller than what was available in Canada.333  Also, the 
residents of Quebec would likely become poorer due to outflow of capital and 
people.  Although, fragmentation of states involves costs in growth 
opportunities, for the majority of Canadian citizens, a “smaller” Canada would 
mean a less diverse and limited realm of opportunities for everyone in the 
remaining provinces of Canada.334 
2. Quebec Remains a Part of Canada 
The second alternative for Quebec is that it remains part of Canada.  
Current politics are relevant to this alternative because the popularity of the 
separatist movement in Quebec relies upon who has the political power in 
Quebec.335  Lucien Bouchard of the PQ Separatist party, retained power as the 
Premier of Quebec in the Premier election in Quebec on November 30, 
1998.336  He defeated the leader of the Liberal Party, Jean Charest.337  Charest 
vowed that he would not present another referendum for secession to the 
people of Quebec.338  He appeals to those who do not want to leave Canada 
and believe that Quebec can maintain its cultural diversity within the Canadian 
framework.339  Although Bouchard and his Separatist party retained control, he 
only received 42.8% of the vote while Charest received 43.6% of the vote.340  
The popular vote can be indicative of the strength of the secessionist 
movement.341  In the 1995 referendum, secession of Quebec had received close 
to fifty percent of the voters.342  In this sense, the separation movement is 
losing strength. 
The fight for secession is also losing momentum with “even the staunchest 
Quebec separatists.”343  Very few people, especially the younger generations, 
bear the fleur-de-lis: the symbol of the Quebec independence movement.344  
People in Quebec, starting with the younger generations, are realizing that 
 
 333. See id. 
 334. See id. 
 335. See generally infra notes 336-39, 387-92 and accompanying text. 
 336. Anthony DePalma, Separatist Premier Keeps Control in Quebec’s Provincial Election, 
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 338. DePalma, supra note 305, at A1. 
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there are other issues that affect them more than secession.345  Quebec as part 
of Canada can take advantage of the opportunities that abound in such an 
influential and diverse country.346  The younger generations realize for the 
most part the importance of strengthening the unity of Canada, evidenced by 
the numbers in the most recent election.347  Many people view Quebec as too 
small a place to settle.348  The election results show that although the 
separatists still retain power the pride and passion of the movement is 
waning.349 
With the Supreme Court’s requirement of a clear majority to a referendum 
question regarding secession, it is unlikely that the support of a clear majority 
will be attainable.  Even Bouchard recognizes that a referendum will not 
happen anytime soon.350  Many voters have viewed this past election not as a 
vote for independence, but as a vote for which party will control the provincial 
government, in respect to issues lobbied for.351  Some of the people who did 
vote for Bouchard support the Separatist movement as leverage against the 
Federal government.352  They believe the threat of the separatists in power can 
be used as a bargaining tool for changes and concerns of the voters.353  In this 
way, Quebec as a province will continue to have its interests protected in the 
national government.  With a dropping percentage of the vote favoring the 
separatist power and the uncertainty surrounding the motivation behind voting, 
all indications suggest that Quebec will remain committed to Canada. 
As part of Canada, Quebec shares in a developed and successful 
economy.354  Thus, the resources and opportunities available in a unified 
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Canada, with a population of over thirty million people, are greater when 
compared with the amount of resources and opportunities available in an 
independent Quebec nation of just over seven million.355  Firms have the 
ability of scale economies and specialization, which results in efficiency and 
decreased costs of production.356  The competitive environment provides for 
the availability of superior products at reasonable prices.  Also, within a larger 
economic union, the flow of information and innovation encourages economic 
progress.357  Within the economic framework of Canada, goods, services, and 
the factors of production flow relatively freely within it.358  Canada’s sheer size 
makes this production efficient to satisfy the needs of its citizens. 
For example, a major defeat to the Separatist movement came during the 
ice storm of 1998.359  Hydro-Quebec, a hydro-electricity plant, has been the 
pride of Quebec, since the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s.360  It has been a 
source of proof for the people of Quebec that they have the resourcefulness to 
be an independent nation.361  “The province of Quebec relies on electricity for 
forty-one percent of its energy consumption, more than double the national 
average.”362  However, during the ice storm, 1.4 million customers were 
without power.363  Quebec was left with a repair bill of over $1 billion to fix 
the electricity problem.364  Quebec was forced to look to the federal 
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government to provide disaster relief to rebuild Hydro-Quebec’s network.365  
For Quebec, Hydro-Quebec is “the symbol of our engineering know-how and 
the flagship of Quebec’s economy.”366  However, after the devastating storm, 
Quebec’s claim to self-sufficiency may be questioned.367 
Quebec, if committed to the Canadian Confederation, will strengthen 
Canada’s influence in the international community as a symbol of “tolerance 
and diversity.”368  In contrast, the future implications of secession by the 
fragmentation of a prosperous and influential country like Canada, would have 
a rippling affect on the international scene.  Secession of Quebec would put 
secession in the spotlight for other countries.369  The message to be sent is that 
diversity within a union does not work. 
For example, in the United States the idea of secession has been recently 
revisited.  The people of Hawaiian descent, about twenty percent of the 
population, have felt ignored by the United States and state government.370  
They feel that their native language and culture is endangered.371  However, 
after Hawaii became a state in 1959, an amendment in 1978 made Hawaiian 
the second official language of the state.372  In addition, two state agencies 
were created specifically to address the needs of the native population.373  Still 
“bitterness remains” over the protection of native Hawaiians distinctive 
interests and culture in the government.374  This sentiment, similar to Quebec, 
fuels the growth of native pride.  As native pride grows, secession could 
become an option.375  However, this option is unlikely as only such a small 
percentage of the Hawaiian population is interested in such a movement.376 
This demonstrates how the secession of Quebec from Canada would be 
seen as an example of how diversity and tolerance failed within a nation.377  To 
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the native population of Hawaii, the secession of Quebec may make secession 
in the United States even more appealing.  If this should occur, the cultural 
vitality that gives an identity to many nations would be jeopardized.  With the 
defeat of such a publicized secessionist movement in Canada, many leaders of 
possible secessionist movements may think twice about their situation and 
evaluate whether independence is their last resort.378 
3. Likely Future of Canada and Quebec 
Given the two alternatives for the future of Quebec and Canada, the likely 
scenario is that Quebec will continue to remain committed to Canada as a 
province of the Canadian Confederation.  As discussed above, secession is an 
alternative that does not make much economic sense for Quebec.379  
Sacrificing the advantages of belonging to an established state engaged in 
economic treaties and the economic resourcefulness of a large nation is not in 
Quebec’s best interest.380  This is taken in the light of the evidence that 
Quebec’s distinctive interests and culture are explicitly represented in the 
federal government.381 
Bouchard the leader of the PQ party, the Separatist party, has been the fuel 
behind the most recent separatist movement.382  He comes from the distant 
northern hills of Quebec, where he really did not see the rest of Canada until he 
was forty-six.383  To Bouchard, Quebec is already a separate nation, which in 
his view is cut off from the rest of Canada culturally and socially.384  He is 
idealistic about promoting the French interests but not realistic about the 
outcomes of secession.  He sells secession to the people of Quebec as an easy 
process, in which they would retain economic, political, and diplomatic 
advantages of the Canadian Confederation.385  However, resulting from the 
Supreme Court decision, secession would not be a simple process for 
Quebec.386 
Thus, the Separatist movement has been promoted as a political 
manifestation more than the will of the people of Quebec.387  The Separatist 
movement politicians of Quebec, like Bouchard, have used the idea of 
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secession to maintain cultural and provincial borders.388  Further, they have 
created a barrier to any Canadian nationalism in Quebec.389  Politicians of the 
separatist movement have ignored issues, such as abortion, pollution control, 
capital punishment, and prison reform, which are non-territorial but national in 
character.390  By concentrating on cultural differences rather than national 
issues important to all Canadians, the separatist leaders of the past thirty years 
of Quebec have promoted secession as the only alternative to preserve the 
French culture from being assimilated into the culture of the English 
majority.391  Although, Canada’s identity has always been one of bi-
culturalism, Bouchard continues to ignore the costs of secession flowing from 
the Supreme Court decision.392 
The failure of the hydro-electric power plant during the ice storm in 1998 
provides an example of the unrealistic aspirations that Bouchard has for 
Quebec as an independent state.393  The failure of Hydro-Electric in Quebec 
during the ice storm takes away from the Separatist belief in Quebec’s self-
sufficiency.394  However, Bouchard, even with the evidence that Quebec 
cannot survive on its own as an independent state, continues to pursue his goal 
of separation.  Clearly, from the economic standpoint, secession is not in the 
best interest of the people of Quebec, which is a facet of separation that 
Bouchard and his party continue to ignore. 
Although Bouchard retained his power as Premier, his separatist 
movement is waning in support.395  Jean Charest, who received close to forty-
three percent of the vote in the last election, comes from the Eastern 
Townships of Quebec where there is pride in accepting differences and 
coexistence.396  In this area, the English and French have lived side by side 
since the emergence of Quebec.397  This is the realistic expectation that Charest 
has for Quebec and the rest of Canada: unified as a nation, as opposed to the 
unrealistic expectations that Bouchard has for Quebec as an independent 
state.398 
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After thirty years, the people of Quebec want to move on to other issues 
like health care, education, and deficit reduction.399  Promoting national issues 
and phasing out territorial, cultural issues will form a national Canadian 
identity, which will eventually bring an end the Separatist movement.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court in deciding the legality of Quebec’s secession from the rest 
of Canada provided an opportunity for national interests to become prominent 
over provincial issues thereby making a successful secession of Quebec from 
Canada difficult.400  Although, it did not prohibit secession, the legal 
requirements make it unlikely.401  Especially as the Separatist party loses 
support, reaching the number of a clear majority becomes unfeasible.  The 
result of the last election only attained a little more than forty percent of the 
vote, nothing close to the numbers now needed for secession.402  Also, there 
was some indication that some voters in the last election voted for the 
separatist party not for secession but for leverage in the central government.403  
Therefore, with a clear question on secession, it looks as if numbers would 
drop even more.  The obstacles of the legal requirements of a successful 
secession set out by the Supreme Court in Canada will keep Quebec as a part 
of Canada.  For the time being, Quebec will continue to contribute to the 
cultural vitality of Canada.404 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of the Independence pointed out, 
“[w]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new 
Government.”405  This is the philosophy that gave Americans their 
independence from Britain.  Ironically, the South used the same principle in its 
attempt to secede from the North in the American Civil War from 1861 to 
1865.406  The South believed that they were states first, and the central 
government could not infringe on states’ rights, especially the right to own 
slaves.407  President Lincoln went to war to preserve the supremacy of the 
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Constitution and the national government.408  The Civil War laid the 
foundation for the future success of America.409 
Today, a secessionist movement is taking hold across the northern 
boundary of the United States where the idea of secession had its roots 135 
years earlier.  Since the Confederation of Canada in 1867, Canada has been 
recognized as a cultural diverse state.  The French, minority, have had their 
rights explicitly protected in the provincial and federal governments.  
However, a political movement evolved in Quebec, promoting territorial 
differences.  Now in Quebec the PQ with their leader Lucien Bouchard, are in 
power, bringing the separatist movement to the forefront.410 
The strength of the Canadian Confederation has been tested not in a 
physical battle, but in the Supreme Court of Canada.  The Court with its 
influential and carefully crafted opinion said a United Canada is in the best 
interest of Quebec and the rest of Canada.  Although these justices did not 
prohibit secession, they made secession difficult.  If the people of Quebec 
show a clear intent to separate in a referendum, then all of Canada will have 
the opportunity to negotiate the terms of secession.  Splitting up 131 years of 
interdependence will not be easy.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
Quebec’s contribution to the cultural vitality of Canada.411 
Canada’s role on the international plane is that of a major industrialized 
nation that is an example of tolerance and ethnic diversity.412  This is Canada’s 
global identity.  The separation of Quebec from Canada would send a message 
that diversity and tolerance cannot prosper together.  If a modern industrialized 
nation cannot be held together over minority interests, secession is seen as an 
alternative that would disrupt the international system of peace, security, and 
stability.413 
The Supreme Court of Canada has laid down the foundation for the defeat 
of the thirty- year separatist movement in Quebec.  The identity of Canada will 
continue to be one of tolerance and diversity within a national boundary.  The 
United States more than a century ago laid its foundation for future success 
through the Civil War.  Canada is now at its defining moment to confirm its 
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